Hồ Chí Minh, Truman and the “Lost Opportunity” (Part I)

This video is the result of a month or so of a lot of work spent trying to learn how to use a DSLR camera, a Zoom h4n audio recorder, Adobe Premiere Pro, Native Instruments Kontakt, FL Studio, etc. I still have a lot to learn, but this video is a lot closer to what I am trying to achieve than any of the other videos that I have created so far.

In focusing so much on trying to get the technology right, however, I overlooked some important issues relating to the content of this video. In particular, I should have mentioned in the introduction that Hồ Chí Minh brought up the point in his letters to President Truman that the US had granted independence to the Philippines. By noting this point, Hồ Chí Minh was (I think) hoping that the US would pressure the French to do the same.

That was a wise and strategic statement to make at that time, but what I try to show in this video is that 1) the “independence” that the US granted the Philippines was a kind of “neo-colonial” independence, and that 2) the French granted the same form of “independence” to Vietnam.

As such, in what Hồ Chí Minh said we can’t see some kind of “shared worldview” or “opportunity” that somehow was unable to materialize at that time (a “lost opportunity”).

Hồ Chí Minh made a strategic statement in an effort to obtain something that he wanted. What Hồ Chí Minh wanted, however, was different from what the US granted the Philippines.

What the US granted the Philippines, meanwhile, was similar to what the French later granted Bao Đại. So that was an opportunity that was “fulfilled.”

However, many people see the fact that Truman did not respond to Hồ Chí Minh’s letters as a “lost opportunity.” This is the issue that this series of videos will seek to problematize.

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This Post Has 8 Comments

  1. Diplomacy is always complex and history is full of grey areas but I dont think sugar $ had much to do with it. But thanks for writing and bringing it up.

    1. leminhkhai

      Thanks for the comment. My point, which I admittedly didn’t make as clear as it should be, is that people who believe in the “lost opportunity” tend to have a very positive image of both the US and HCM. The idea that the US is the only colonial power to have set a date for its colony’s independence fits that positive view. The fact that HCM mentioned that issue is something that also makes people who believe in the “lost opportunity” feel like he shared a worldview with Americans.

      However, the reality was not so rosy or simple. 1) The “independence” that the US granted the Philippines was tied down with unequal relations (particularly economic – consult the Tydings-McDuffie Act, or do a Google search for “sugar and Philippine independence”) that ensured that a post-colonial Philippines would be limited in its independence. 2) Other colonial rulers, like the British in India and Burma, may not have publicly stated that those colonies would become independent, but that was clearly the direction that those societies were going. 3) The kind of “independence” that was granted to the Philippines was not unlike the kind of independence that the French granted to the State of Vietnam, which then became South Vietnam.

      So if the US had agreed to back HCM and urge the French to grant independence to Vietnam, what would that independence have looked like? I suspect that the French would have wanted an arrangement similar to the one the Americans got in the Philippines, in which case, that’s what Bao Dai got, so why is the fact that Truman did not respond to HCM seen as a lost opportunity? Why isn’t Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam seen as a “lost opportunity”? In the context of the time, the Filipinos and Bao Dai et al. chose a path towards “independence” that continued certain colonial relations, but it avoided much of the violence, death and destruction that other paths towards independence passed through.

      The idea of the “lost opportunity” imagines that much of that death and destruction could have been avoided if Truman had responded to HCM, because after all, he had a positive view of the US as that was the only colonial power in the world to have declared that it would grant independence to its colony. . . Do you see the point? As long as this idea doesn’t take into account any of the above greyness, it sounds convincing, but when you look more closely, it starts to lose its persuasiveness as it’s too simplistic.

      This is a topic that I’ve written about before, so these videos will basically rehash the same old stuff:

      https://leminhkhai.wordpress.com/2014/04/30/a-lost-opportunity-or-opportunism-in-1945-vietnam/

  2. riroriro

    _ another possible motivation for the USA to give Filipinos their indemendance : from 1945 , the Yankees were bent on replacing the other
    colonialists , they were mouthing the pretense of liberating the ” colored ”
    people from that yoke . It would be embarassing for them at that time to keep the Philippines under their rule
    _ HCM calling on the US to pressure the French shows at that time an ignorance (? ) of recent Philippines history . In 1898 , the Filipinos rose up against the Spaniards who instead of withdrawing simply sold their colonial rights to the Americans ; the US then crushed the insurgents à la Genghis
    Khan . That massacre was carefully hidden : it’s written everywhere , the US for their counterinsurgency tactics in VN after 1954 relied on the French in Indochina and British experience in Malaysia ; sometimes , the crushing of the Fipipino Huks is mentioned but fleetingly .
    _ before the US intervention , Kipling wrote the (in) famous ” the white man’s burden ” where he urged President Kinley to come and bestow the benefits of civilisation on the “natives ”
    _The US stole brazenly Filipino independance during 50 years and “gave ” them back in 1946 a spurious independance , what a shameful charade !!!
    _ the same charade was perpetrated on Vietnam with the creation of the Bao dai regime . The French were still in power , they just switched labels , the native soldiers and officials under their orders were renames ” national army of Vietnam ” and government of the State of Vietnam “

  3. dustofthewest

    The parallel between U.S. / Philippines and France / Vietnam provides a lot of food for thought. I think there’s something to it. But at the same time wasn’t the U.S. dealing with a fairly unified Philippines, while the Vietnam was divided into two competing camps? I think it’s fair to say that Vietnam was already engaged in a civil war. France granted independence to the weaker of the two sides and did so as a diplomatic measure to counter the stronger side.

    What if the French had offered the same terms to the Viet Minh government in 1946? That would have been a real opportunity to either take advantage of or miss. The French were perhaps 4 years too late.

    I come more and more to the conclusion that there was a dominant group — the Viet Minh, the Communists — that, yes, wanted independence and a united country. But they also wanted to be in charge and to see their vision realized throughout the country and this second wish was at least as strong as the first and maybe even stronger.

    1. riroriro

      @dust of the west :
      _ [ Vietnam was divided into two competing camps ] ? The Indochina war started in 1946 , the Bao dai regime was invented as a figleaf in 1949 , due to the deteriorating French situation of which one factor was the approaching victory of Mao .
      _ [ France granted independence to the weaker of the two sides and did so as a diplomatic measure to counter the stronger side ] the main motivation behind the move was the American pressure , they had decided to throw their support to the French but they were afraid their Senate and public opinion would balk to the dispensation of US money to the support of colonialists , so the need for a figleaf .
      _ about the motivations and wishes of Ho chi minh and the VN communists , let ‘s recall that when HCM started his long journey , USSR did’nt exist yet . Afterwards , the VN – coms watched the USSR grow to a super power thanks to the communist ideology . Would ‘nt it be realistic , pragmatic for colonized people to try that ” medecine ” or doctrine ? They first wanted independance , then the empowerment of their country . They were not Komintern servants or zealots working for the subversion ( or religious conversion ) of the world The USSR didn(t recognize HCM ‘s regime until 1950 ; I think .

  4. leminhkhai

    Yes, and that second wish has been mythologized in ways that take away that desire for power and replace it with the idea that there was only one group of true nationalists, only one group that could effectively run the country, etc.

    The idea of the “lost opportunity” is based on this mythologized view of the past (and on a mythologized view of the power and goodness of the US). It’s based on the belief that the US (a country that always stands up for what is right) had the opportunity to recognize that group (the “only logical choice”) in 1945/6 and to thereby change the course of history.

    1. dustofthewest

      I think that’s spot on – the belief that the U.S. (the beacon for freedom and independence) should have, could have, would have done the right thing and brought freedom and independence to Vietnam if only Harry Truman had answered his mail.

      And the flip side is that the group deserving of freedom and independence for Vietnam had contacted Harry Truman and he failed to recognize how deserving they were. And there was no possible alternative to this deserving group.

  5. dustofthewest

    Ah, I hadn’t seen part 2 yet. You’ve already got it down.

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